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Marcuse v. Del Webb Communities, 123 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 30  
(August 2, 2007)1 
 





Appeal of a district court’s dismissal of a construction defect class action. Also, 
appeal from a district court’s denial of appellants’ motion to consolidate their claim and 
their motion for a separate trial within a class action (first action) and appeal from a 
district court’s order granting respondent’s motion to dismiss appellant’s pursuit of a 
second action independent from the class action under the doctrines of res judicata and 
collateral estoppel (second action).  The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the district 
court’s dismissal of the class action based on the settlement and reversed the district 




 First action: Affirmed.  Unnamed class members who have already objected to the 
approval of a settlement in a timely manner at a fairness hearing have standing to appeal 
without formally intervening.  However, the district court did not err in its final approval 
of the settlement and the appellants’ objection to the settlement was focused on their right 
to recover resultant damages rather than the merits and actual subject matter of the class 
settlement as a whole.  As such, the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting 
final approval of the settlement.  Also, because respondents assured the district court that 
the appellants could still file a second action outside of the class action, the district court 
did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to consolidate and the motion for a 
separate trial within the class action. 
 
Second action: Reversed. When a party takes an inconsistent position to gain an 
unfair advantage, the doctrine of judicial estoppel applies and res judicata and collateral 
estoppel should not be applied to dismiss the relevant action. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 Appellants Irwin and Edith Marcuse owned a home in the Sun City Summerlin 
housing development which was built by respondent Del Webb Communities, Inc.  The 
homes, including the Marcuses’ home, were constructed with defective unsleeved, 
underslab domestic water copper plumbing lines.  In July 2001, five homeowners filed a 
class action lawsuit against Del Webb on behalf of Summerlin homeowners, based on the 
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latent deficiencies.  The class consisted of all homeowners with unsleeved, underslab 
copper plumbing.   
            In January 2002, the district court certified the class.  Class members could opt 
out of the class no later than November 15, 2002.    By the November opt-out date, the 
Marcuses had neither opted out of the class nor experienced an actual plumbing failure. 
However, on May 23, 2003, the Marcuses house flooded.  The source of the water was a 
leak or rupture in the underslab water pipes.  The Marcuses could no longer opt out.   
            Del Webb paid for the costs of repairing the defective plumbing in the Marcuses’ 
home, but did not compensate the Marcuses for the full damages that resulted, the 
resultant damages.  Following negotiations with the class, the class plaintiffs agreed to 
dismiss from the class action all members who had experienced underslab plumbing leaks 
and whose defective plumbing had been repaired by Del Webb.   
            The Marcuses attempted to resolve their resultant damages claim within the class 
action by filing a motion to consolidate their claim with the class action claims, under 
NRCP 23 and NRCP 42(a).  Del Webb opposed, arguing that (1) contrary to the 
requirements of NRCP 42(a), the Marcuses had failed to demonstrate any pending action 
involving a common question of law or fact, and (2) there were no common questions of 
law or fact between the Marcuses’ claims and the class’s claims, since the class action 
sought recovery for future damages, not resultant damages.  However, Del Webb asserted 
that the Marcuses could pursue a second action against Del Webb to recover resultant 
damages.  The district court denied the motion to consolidate.   
           The Marcuses filed another motion under NRCP 23 and NRCP 42(b) for a 
separate trial within the class action on their resultant damages.  The Marcuses asserted 
that Del Webb had essentially agreed in its opposition to the motion to consolidate that a 
separate trial was appropriate.  Del Webb opposed, arguing that (1) the Marcuses still had 
failed to file their own complaint or show any pending action, and thus their motion fell 
outside the scope of NRCP 42; (2) NRCP 23 did not support the Marcuses’ position 
because the Marcuses were no longer members of the class, since the class sought 
recovery for future damages and the Marcuses had actual, not future, damages; and (3) a 
separate trial within the class action would prejudice Del Webb because it would not have 
any opportunity to conduct discovery.  The court orally denied the Marcuses’ motion. 
           In June 2004, the district court granted preliminary approval of a proposed class 
settlement for $21.5 million.  The proposed settlement notified the class members that the 
settlement was only for class plaintiffs whose homes had not yet been repaired, and that 
any homeowners whose plumbing had already been repaired would not receive any of the 
settlement proceeds.   
            The Marcuses immediately filed an independent complaint against Del Webb to 
initiate the second action.  Del Webb filed a motion to dismiss the second action, arguing 
that the Marcuses had participated in the class action as class members, that their claims 
had already been litigated in the class action, and that the doctrines of res judicata and 
collateral estoppel prevented the Marcuses from re-litigating their claims.  The district 
court determined that the Marcuses’ status as class members in the class action, since the 
Marcuses never opted out of nor were removed from the class, barred re-litigation of any 
claims that were or could have been part of the class action.  Thus, the district court 
granted Del Webb’s motion to dismiss the second action based upon the doctrines of res 
judicata and collateral estoppel. 
            In August 2004, the class representatives filed a motion for final approval of the 
settlement in the class action.  The Marcuses opposed the settlement and challenged its 
effect on their resultant damages claim.  Thereafter, the Marcuses filed an NRCP 60(b) 
motion for relief from any judgment, order, or proceeding in the class action that affected 
their ability to pursue their claim for resultant damages.  The district court granted the 
class representatives’ motion and approved the settlement.  The district court then entered 
its final judgment―a stipulation and order dismissing the class action with prejudice.  
Finally, the district court denied the Marcuses’ NRCP 60(b) motion but did not elaborate 
upon its reasoning.  The Marcuses appealed the district court’s order dismissing the class 
action with prejudice and the district court’s order granting Del Webb’s motion to 
dismiss the second action.   
 
Discussion 
Standing and final approval of the settlement 
            The Court stated that the issue of whether an unnamed class member has standing 
to appeal from the final judgment in a class action was an issue of first impression in 
Nevada.  The Court cited Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 14 (2002), recognizing that 
the United States Supreme Court has held that an unnamed class member who has 
already objected to the approval of a settlement in a timely manner at a fairness hearing 
has standing to appeal without formally intervening.  The United States Supreme Court 
reasoned that unnamed class members are parties to the proceedings in that they are 
bound to the final settlement in a class action.  If unnamed class members who timely 
object to a settlement in a fairness hearing lack standing to appeal the approval of the 
settlement, then they are deprived of the ability to preserve “their own interests in a 
settlement that will ultimately bind them, despite their expressed objections before the 
trial court.”2  
            The Court also cited Powers v. Eichen, 229 F.3d 1249, 1256 (9th Cir. 2000), in 
which the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that an unnamed class member in a 
shareholders’ securities fraud class action, after filing an objection with the trial court to 
the amount of attorney fees requested in a settlement, had standing to challenge the award 
of such fees without first intervening.  As such, pursuant to Devlin and Powers, the Court 
held that the objection filed in connection with the class action settlement was sufficient 
to give notice of the Marcuses’ intent to preserve the collateral relief they sought and that 
to require an application for intervention to raise the objection would unduly burden class 
proceedings.  Accordingly, the Marcuses had standing to object to the proposed 
settlement and to appeal the district court’s order dismissing the class action based on the 
settlement.3   
                                                 
2 Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 14 (2002). 
3 The Court stated: “This conclusion also rests upon the unique nature of the class action, whereby an 
unnamed class member is a party to the class action despite being unnamed, even though only the named 
representatives pursue claims on behalf of the class.”  Marcuse v. Del Webb Communities, 123 Nev. Adv. 
Op. No. 30 (August 2, 2007). 
            Even so, the Court did not find error in the district court’s final approval of the 
settlement.  Moreover, the Marcuses’ objection to the settlement was focused on their 
right to recover resultant damages rather than the merits and actual subject matter of the 
class settlement as a whole.  As such, the Court concluded that the district court did not 
abuse its discretion in granting final approval of the settlement.  
The Marcuses’ motion to consolidate and motion for a separate trial 
            The Court cited both NRCP 42(a) and FRCP 42(a) to establish that both allow for 
consolidation of actions that involve a common question of law or fact.  Furthermore, the 
Court pointed out that it has held that a district court exercises its own sound discretion in 
considering a motion to order a separate trial under NRCP 42(b).4  The Court cited State, 
Dep’t of Mtr. Vehicles v. Moss, 106 Nev. 866, 868, (1990), stating that “[p]olicy strongly 
favors deciding cases on their merits.”  The Court also mentioned its support of the class 
action framework because it promotes efficiency and justice and that, ordinarily, judicial 
economy would promote the trial of claims such as the Marcuses’ claims within a class 
action.  However, in opposing the Marcuses’ motion to consolidate and motion for a 
separate trial within the class action, Del Webb claimed that the Marcuses were free to 
file a second action against Del Webb outside of the class action.  Thus, because the 
Marcuses could file a second action, they would not suffer any prejudice if the district 
court denied their motion to consolidate and motion for a separate trial within the class 
action.  As such, the Court determined that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying the motion to consolidate and the motion for a separate trial within the class 
action.  
Judicial estoppel and the dismissal of the second action 
            The Court stated that the application of judicial estoppel is a question of law 
which this court reviews de novo.5  The Court reviewed five criteria for when judicial 
estoppel applies.6  The central purpose of judicial estoppel is to guard the judiciary’s 
integrity, and thus a court may invoke the doctrine at its own discretion.7  However, the 
Court stated that judicial estoppel should be applied only when “‘a party’s inconsistent 
position [arises] from intentional wrongdoing or an attempt to obtain an unfair 
advantage.’”8  The Court added that the doctrine of judicial estoppel “does not preclude 
changes in position that are not intended to sabotage the judicial process.”9 
            The Court noted that in its opposition to the Marcuses’ motion to consolidate, Del 
Webb asserted that the Marcuses were not members of the class.  Yet in its motion to 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
4 C.S.A.A. v. District Court, 106 Nev. 197, 199, 788 P.2d 1367, 1368 (1990). 
5 NOLM, LLC v. County of Clark, 120 Nev. 736, 743, 100 P.3d 658, 663 (2004). 
6 The five criteria are as follows:  (1) the same party has taken two positions; (2) the positions were taken in 
judicial or quasi-judicial administrative proceedings; (3) the party was successful in asserting the first 
position (i.e., the tribunal adopted the position or accepted it as true); (4) the two positions are totally 
inconsistent; and (5) the first position was not taken as a result of ignorance, fraud, or mistake.  Id. (quoting 
Furia v. Helm, 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 357, 368 (Ct. App. 2003)).  
7 Id.  
8 Id. (quoting Kitty-Anne Music Co. v. Swan, 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 796, 800 (Ct. App. 2003) (alteration in 
original)). 
9 Id. 
dismiss and during the hearing on the motion, Del Webb argued that the Marcuses were 
members of the class and had thereby already litigated their issues in the class action suit.  
Thus, based on the five criteria for applying judicial estoppel, the Court stated that it was 
clear that judicial estoppel was the appropriate basis upon which to deny the motion to 
dismiss as Del Webb took totally inconsistent positions in the separate judicial 
proceedings.  Furthermore, given the timing and the degree of inconsistency between the 
two positions, the Court found it evident that Del Webb’s second position was designed 
to obtain an unfair advantage and did not represent a mere change in position.  
Accordingly, the Court concluded that the district court erred by granting the motion to 
dismiss based upon the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, when it should 
have denied the motion based upon the doctrine of judicial estoppel.   
   
Conclusion 
 
First action: Affirmed.  Unnamed class members who have already objected to the 
approval of a settlement in a timely manner at a fairness hearing have standing to appeal 
without formally intervening.  However, the district court did not err in its final approval 
of the settlement and the appellants’ objection to the settlement was focused on their right 
to recover resultant damages rather than the merits and actual subject matter of the class 
settlement as a whole.  As such, the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting 
final approval of the settlement.  Also, because respondents assured the district court that 
the appellants could still file a second action outside of the class action, the district court 
did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to consolidate and the motion for a 
separate trial within the class action. 
 
Second action: Reversed. When a party takes an inconsistent position to gain an 
unfair advantage, the doctrine of judicial estoppel applies and res judicata and collateral 
estoppel should not be applied to dismiss the relevant action. 
 
   
 
